7. again] the second time (R.V.).

7–12. The wise men profess their willingness to interpret the king’s dream: but protest that his demand that they should tell him what his dream was is an extravagant one. Nebuchadnezzar, however, adheres to his original demand: and as they are unable to comply with it, commands them to be put to death.

Verse 7. - They answered again and said, Let the king tell his servants the dream, and we will show the interpretation of it. The Septuagint Version here is, "And they answered the second time, saying, O king, tell the dream, and thy servants will judge of these things." Theodotion, the Peshitta, and the Vulgate agree with the Massoretic. The wise men are unable to satisfy the king's demands. Ewald comments on the fact that none of them had the inventiveness to make up a dream, and tell the king that had been his dream. He admits himself that there might have been risk of the king discovering the deception, if no flash of reviving memory in his mind answered to their invention. On our hypothesis that the king had not forgotten his dream, but was testing their powers, it was not only in the highest degree hazardous, but it was certain of failure. They must have known the case to be as we imagine it, or, when they were sentenced to death, they would have run the hazard, on the plea, "If we perish, we perish." There was a chance, though a faint one, of success in the attempt to palm off upon the king their own imaginings for his dream; there was a certainty of death if they did nothing. All they can do, however, is simply to repeat what they before said, "Tell us the dream, and we will find the interpretation of it." Nebuchadnezzar has often been denounced as specially foolish and tyrannical on account of this demand which he made of the wise men; but tyrannical though he was, and foolish though he seems at times, looked at from our elevation, this demand of his is not an example either of his folly or his tyranny. These soothsayers enjoyed great honour and great revenues, on the assumption that they possessed certain powers of foreseeing the future. He demands of them, instead of an enigmatical statement of what was coming on the earth, that they tell him what he had dreamed. They professed to be able to discover thefts, and where stolen property was; they professed to point out men who were devising evil against another. If their claims were true, they could surely tell the king his dream. They were thus employed and honoured in order that they should foretell to the king any fortune, good or bad, impending himself or the natron. His dream presumably foretold the future; they affirmed that they knew the future; they surely might tell the king what prophecy was made to him in his dream. Believing in the reality of their powers with all the faith of a fanatic, their refusal could only mean to him treason. They did not tell him his dream, not because they could not, but because they would not, in order that the disaster - for such he would be sure the dream portended - might not be averted by timely sacrifices. If the elaborate treatises on magic and divination which have come to us, so far as has been discovered, only in fragments, were complete, it is not impossible that we might be able to tell what interpretation these wise men would have put on the dream, had they been told it. It would be a curious exercise, for certainly Daniel's interpretation would not be the result. We must return to the versions for a little, in one respect the Septuagint is closer to the Massoretic than Theodotion, by having λέγοντες, the participle, instead of εϊπαν. We direct attention to this, with a view to the phenomenon we find in the succeeding clause. The Septuagint rendering is given above. The most noticeable thing which the reader will find about this rendering is the change of person in the last clause. As it stands in the Massoretic text, it is certainly the first person plural Imperfect pael of חוה; but in Syriac the preformative נ was the sign of the third person in the imperfect, as well as of the first person plural; hence, if there were a little uncertainty as to the end of the word, it was an easy mistake to one who was reading from a manuscript in Eastern Aramaic, but an impossible one for a scribe translating from a manuscript written in Chaldee, or Western Aramaic. It cannot be urged plausibly that the change might simply result from a free translation, for the slavish accuracy of the rest of the verse precludes that escape. As the reading of the Greek is confirmed by the version of Paulus Tel-lensis, the probability is slight of a various reading. This is another evidence that Daniel was originally written in Eastern, not Western Aramaic. It may be observed that while in the Massoretic text the verb "tell" (y'emar) is put in the imperfect, in the Septuagint it is translated as it' it were. imperative. The difference between the third person imperfect and the second person imperative is the presence, in the case of the former, of the preformative y (י), which is absent in the other. That is a thing that might easily happen, that, (yodh) might be dropped or inserted mistakenly; consequently, this affords no evidence that the Septuagint translator took liberties with his text. The question may be put, how tar these soothsayers knew they were impostors. Most likely they were unconscious of anything approaching imposition. We know the elaborate rules by which they determined the exact meaning of every sign and portent. We know how prone men are to supplement such rules by a native faculty for foreseeing what is likely to happen, and how, further, explanations may be devised to save the credit of these canons of interpretation, even when most hopelessly proved to be false by events. Archdeacon Rose appeals to modern spiritualists as examples in point, regarding both the Chaldean soothsayers and modern spiritualists as equally impostors. We feel inclined to regard them as so far alike in this - that most of both classes imposed most on themselves. The presence of these false prophets is an evidence of the existence of the true prophets at some time, at all events; there would be no counterfeit coin were there no genuine money. Daniel 2:7The wise men repeat their request, but the king persists that they only justify his suspicion of them by pressing such a demand, and that he saw that they wished to deceive him with a self-conceived interpretation of the dream. וּפשׁרה is not, as Hitz. proposes, to be changed into וּפשׁרה. The form is a Hebr. stat. emphat. for וּפשׁרא, as e.g., מלּתה, Daniel 2:5, is changed into מלּתא in Daniel 2:8 and Daniel 2:11, and in biblical Chaldee, in final syllables הis often found instead of .א fo Daniel 2:7 Interlinear
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